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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
COURTS-COURTS

OF

LIMITED

OR

INFERIOR

JURISDICTION-WHETHER

THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO HAS JURISDICTION OVER A
TRANSITORY TORT CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH AROSE OUTSIDE OF THE CITY
LHIITS--In the case of United Biscuit Company of America v. Voss Truck
Lines, Inc.,' the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages resulting
1340 Ill. App. 503, 92 N. E. (2d) 478 (1950).
Chicago bar, appeared as amicus curiae.

Hirsch E. Soble, Esq., of the

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

from a collision between two trucks. The trucks were driven by the
servants of the litigants and the accident occurred near Braidwood, Will
County, Illinois. The case went to trial without a jury before a judge of
the Municipal Court of Chicago. That judge, on learning that the cause
of action arose outside of the city limits of the City of Chicago, decided that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and entered
a judgment dismissing the action. It was stipulated on appeal from that
judgment that there was no question as to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant and that the sole question was one as to
whether or not the Municipal Court of Chicago had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The Appellate Court for the First District
affirmed the judgment of the lower court, thereby deciding that the court
in question did not have jurisdiction over a transitory tort cause of action
2
based upon events occurring outside of the city limits.
The solution to the problem of whether or not the Municipal Court of
Chicago possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine transitory causes of
action originating elsewhere depends on whichever of two constitutional
provisions is to be considered the basis for the establishment of that
tribunal. The two possibilities are Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1870 on the one hand, and Section 34 of Article IV, the so-called
"home rule" amendment, on the other. The first of these 3 confers judicial
power on certain specified constitutional courts but goes on to provide for
the exercise thereof by other local tribunals which may be created by the
legislature. 4 It has been held to be the sole basis for the existence of city
courts 5 and, as these courts have been determined to possess only city-wide
2 A certificate of importance has been issued and the Supreme Court of Illinois
is expected to hear the case at the September term. The issue in the case has
become increasingly important since the decision in the case of Werner v. Illinois
Central Railroad Co., 379 Iil. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), which held that a city
court has no jurisdiction over a tort cause of action which arises outside of the
city limits.
3 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1, states: "The judicial powers, except as in this
article is otherwise provided, shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts,

county courts, Justices of the Peace, police magistrates, and such courts as may be

created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns."
4 Provisions for the creation of local or inferior courts have appeared in each
of the Illinois constitutions. The earliest provision was Ill. Const. 1818, Art. IV,
§ 1, which reads: "The judicial power shall be vested in . . . such inferior courts
as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish." It was
followed by Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V, § 1, which then read: "The judicial power
shall be and is hereby vested in one supreme court . . . Provided, that the

inferior local courts, of civil and criminal jurisdiction, may be established by the
general assembly in the cities of this state, but such courts shall have a uniform
organization and jurisdiction in such cities." The absence of a requirement for
uniformity in the 1818 constitution had resulted in the creation of a series of local
courts with varying jurisdiction. The present constitutional provision is set out
in note 3, ante.
5 People ex rel. Beebe v. Evans, 18 Ill. 362 (1857).
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jurisdiction, 6 it follows that, because of the requirement for uniformity
and the prohibition against local legislation, 7 only city-wide jurisdiction
could be given to local courts created thereunder. If, therefore, this constitutional provision controls, it comes as a necessary conclusion that the
Municipal Court of Chicago can have only city-wide jurisdiction and may
not hear transitory causes originating elsewhere.
If, however, the second constitutional provision forms the sole basis
for the existence of the court in question, a different conclusion could well
be reached. That provision allows the legislature to pass local laws for the
City of Chicago in connection with a variety of subjects8 including the
establishment of a municipal court, the jurisdiction of which was left to be
determined by the general assembly. Nowhere in that provision is there
any restriction on the nature of the jurisdiction which the general assembly
might confer on the court so to be created. For that matter, there is nothing in the provision to indicate that it is to be subject to restraints contained in any other constitutional provision. As a state constitution is a
limitation on the powers of a state legislature and not, generally, a delegation of powers to that body,9 the legislature is free to do anything not
6 City of Chicago v. Reeves, 220 Ill. 274, 77 N. E. 237 (1906).
In spite of this,
the legislature by an amendment of the City Court Act adopted In 1943, set out in
Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 578, deleted the words "arising in said city," in an obvious
attempt to give to the city courts a jurisdiction wider than the city limits. In
the case of Govan v. Govan, 331 Ill. App. 372, 73 N. E. (2d) 163 (1947), tried

before a city court subsequent to the amendment, a judgment based on a transitory

cause of action was affirmed but the constitutionality of the amendment was not
passed upon. It is understood that the Illinois Supreme Court, in a case entitled
Turnbaugh v. Dunlop, No. 31539, not yet reported, held the present City Court Act,
as so amended, to be valid and broad enough to permit a city court to entertain a
transitory action in tort based on events arising outside of the city limits.
7 See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 29, for the requirement as to uniformity, and

Art. IV, § 22, for the prohibition against special legislation.

8 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34, added by amendment in 1904, states in part:
"The General Assembly shall have power, subject to the conditions and limitations
hereinafter contained, to pass any law (local, special or general) providing for a
scheme or charter of local municipal government for the territory now or hereafter embraced within the limits of the city of Chicago . . . and in case the
General Assembly shall create municipal courts in the city of Chicago it may

abolish the offices of Justices of the Peace, Police Magistrates and Constables

in and for the territory within said city . . . and in such case the jurisdiction and
practice of said municipal courts shall be such as the General Assembly shall
prescribe; and the General Assembly may pass all laws which it may deem
requisite to effectually provide for a complete system of local municipal government in and for the city of Chicago. No law based upon this amendment . . .
shall take effect until such law shall be consented to by a majority of the legal
voters of said city voting on the question at any election. . . " The purpose of
the referendum has been said to be one designed to provide protection for the
citizens of Chicago while, at the same time, replacing the necessity for uniformity
and overcoming the prohibition against special legislation: City of Chicago v.
Cook County, 370 Ill. 301, 18 N. E. (2d) 890 (1939).
9 Herb v. Pitcairn, 392 Ill. 138, 64 N. E. (2d) 519 (1946); City of Chicago v.
County of Cook, 370 Ill. 301, 18 N. E. (2d) 890 (1939) ; Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain
Corp., 355 Ill. 504, 189 N. E. 907 (1934).
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restricted by the constitution. One does not, therefore, have to look to that
document so much to find authority for the creation of a Municipal Court
for the City of Chicago as one must look to see to it that no limitation is
placed therein on the powers of the legislature. For this, and other reasons, when the general assembly has concluded that a law is requisite, its
conclusion should not be the subject of judicial review. 10
Another indication that the "home rule" amendment, later in point of
time than the first of these provisions, was not designed to restrict the
territorial jurisdiction which the general assembly could confer on the
Municipal Court exists in the historical situation which gave rise to the
adoption of that amendment. At the turn of the century, as now, the
population of Chicago was greater in number than that of all the rest of
the state when combined. It had problems unlike those of any other section
of the state, and was constantly hampered in its actions by the restriction
against special legislation. The justice of the peace system had proved its
inadequacy while the creation of a typical city court, such as those which
existed in other parts of the state, would not serve its need. The circumstance of the times dictates the belief that the framers of the "home rule"
amendment contemplated a marked change in the local court system for
Chicago. It can, therefore, be logically argued that it was the intention of
the public, by amending the state constitution, to allow the legislature to
confer that type of jurisdiction which it could well feel was necessary.
If the intention was merely to create a court similar to a city court,
with territorial limitations necessarily imposed on its jurisdiction, there
was no need for the judicial portion of the amendment as it was already
within the power of the general assembly to create such a court. It is likewise difficult to become reconciled to the idea that the whole amendment,
with its clauses allowing the setting up of a municipal court, was intended
merely to give to the legislature the power to determine jurisdiction in
other than territorial terms," particularly since there is no mention of
such a restriction in the amendment. Knowing, as the framers did, that a
tribunal of the character of a city court would prove as inadequate as the
justice of the peace system had proved itself to be in the administration of
justice for Chicago, they must have had something different in mind. The
"home rule" amendment having been adopted to meet a new situation, one
never before encountered in the judicial history of the state, is it not
logical to suppose that the proposed municipal court was to possess a
10 People v. LaSalle Street Bank, 269 Ill. 518, 110 N. E. 38 (1915) ; Hirschback v.
Kaskaskia Sanitary District, 265 Ill. 388, 106 N. E. 942 (1914); City v. Evans,
204 Ill. 32, 68 N. E. 208 (1903) ; Sanitary District v. Ray, 199 Ili. 63, 64 N. E. 1048
(1902).
11 But see Wilcox v. Conklin, 255 Ill. 604, 99 N. E. 669 (1912).
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jurisdiction, and follow a practice, unlike that of any court theretofore
existing ?12
But the matter need not rest entirely on inference. Impelling reason
against a jurisdictional limitation of city-wide scope is to be found in the
sections of the amendment relating to the assumption, by the new court, of
the unfinished business being handled by the justices of the peace located
in the city. The latter had exercised at least county-wide jurisdiction
without question 13 so the new court, authorized by the amendment, necessarily had to possess an equivalent jurisdiction at the start in order to take
over the work of the justices of the peace. There being no language indicating a desire to deny the exercise of such power after these cases were
concluded, it can only be supposed the new court was to retain such jurisdiction. Why, then, should it be given jurisdiction for one purpose and
not another?
The only really basic argument against the exercise of an extraterritorial jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Chicago is the wording
of the amendment making it possible to establish a court "in the city of
Chicago.' 4 It has been said that the word "in," as used in the phrase
"in and for" as it relates to the creation of city courts, 15 is a word of art
necessarily designed to confine the territorial jurisdiction to city limits.16
But other cases do not treat the phrase as being one of art sufficient by
itself to fix a territorial jurisdiction. 1 7 For example, in the recent case of
Moffett v. Green,'5 the Illinois Supreme Court held that, although a justice
of the peace is to serve "in and for" the township in which he was elected,
yet he has county-wide jurisdiction. If the meaning of the phrase "in and
for" as it relates to the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is to be so
extended, it is only fair to conclude that the court should reach the same
result as to the identical word in the amendment relating to the Municipal
Court of Chicago.
If, as has been pointed out, Section 34 of Article IV of the Illinois
Constitution of 1870 is the only constitutional authority for the establish12 People v. Board of County Commissioners, 355 Il. 244, 189 N. E. 26 (1934);
Lott v. Davis, 264 Ill.
272, 106 N. E. 215 (1914).
13 Moffett v. Green, 386 Ill. 318, 53 N. E. (2d) 941 (1944) ; Tissler v. Rhein, 130
Ill.
110, 22 N. E. 848 (1889).
14 IR. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34. Italics added.
15

Ibid., Art. VI, § 1.

The text thereof is set forth in note 3, ante.

16 Conrad v. Conrad, 396 Ill. 101, 71 N. E. (2d) 54 (1947) ; McFarland v. McFarland, 384 Ill. 428, 51 N. E. (2d) 520 (1943) ; Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
17 Herb v. Pitcairn, 392 Ill. 138, 64 N. E. (2d) 519 (1946) ; Moffett v. Green, 386
Ill. 318, 53 N. E. (2d) 941 (1944).
'8 386 fll. 318, 53 N. E. (2d) 941 (1944.).
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ment of the Municipal Court of Chicago, logic would dictate that the
legislature must be regarded as empowered to confer upon that court
whatever jurisdiction it may please, subject to ratification by the people of
Chicago, without limitation as to the type of action or the place of its
origin, so long as the case be one of transitory character. 1 Any attempt to
resolve the problem, then, necessarily results in a return to the fundamental one of choosing between the two constitutional provisions aforementioned. There is little assistance to be gleaned from statements made
by the Illinois Supreme Court in the past which may have bearing on the
point. On various occasions, but in relation to totally different problems
than the one which will now confront it, that court has stated that Section 1
of Article VI of the constitution is the sole basis for the legislative power
to create local courts. 20

If these statements are to control, the jurisdiction

of the Municipal Court of Chicago would necessarily be limited. Other
cases declare in no uncertain terms that Section 34 of Article IV, the
"home rule" amendment, is the basis for the existence of the Municipal
Court of Chicago. 21 To add to the confusion, however, other conflicting
statements have been made regarding its jurisdiction, 22 so it is not possible
to predict how the Supreme Court will eventually decide the issue. Despite
this conflict and the apparent uncertainty existing in the mind of the
Supreme Court, it would appear logical to believe that the inclusion of a
19 Care should be taken to distinguish the statute relating to the Municipal Court
of Chicago, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §§ 356-426, from the general statute
as to other municipal courts, ibid., Ch. 37, § § 442-504. The constitutional basis for
the latter is necessarily to be found in Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1, with its confining limitation that the legislature may create such inferior courts only "in and
for" cities and incorporated towns. While the legislature may, and has, created
municipal courts in other cities, the territorial jurisdiction thereof is confined by
the constitutional language in much the same way as is true of the city courts.
Arguments which may be advanced relating to the Municipal Court of Chicago are,
therefore, generally inapplicable to other municipal courts located in Illinois.
20 Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942)
City of Chicago v. Cook County, 370 Ill. 301, 18 N. E. (2d) 890 (1939) ; Wilcox v.
Conklin, 255 Ill. 604, 99 N. E. 669 (1912); People v. Cosmopolitan Fire Ins. Co.,
246 Ill. 442, 92 N. E. 922 (1910) ; People ex rel. Sadler v. Olson, 245 Ill. 288, 92
N. E. 157 (1910) ; Miller v. People, 230 Ill. 65, 82 N. E. 521 (1907) ; Rowe v. Bowen,
People ex rel. Beebe v. Evans, 18 Ill. 362 (1857) ; Galpin v.
28 Il1. 116 (1862)
City of Chicago, 159 Ill. App. 135 (1910), affirmed in 249 Ill. 5.54, 94 N. E. 961
(1910).
21 City of Chicago v. Cook County, 370 Ill. 301, 18 N. E. (2d) 890 (1939) ; People
ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 358 Ill. 261, 192 N. E. 193 (1934) ; Swigart v. City of Chicago,
223 Ill. 371, 79 N. E. 48 (1906).
22 Language in People v. City Court of East St. Louis, 338 I1. 363, 170 N. E. 210
(1930) ; Israelstam v. U. S. Casualty Co., 272 Ill. 161, 111 N. E. 602 (1916) ; Morton
v. Pusey, 237 Ill. 26, 86 N. E. 610 (1908) ; and in Miller v. People, 230 Ill. 65, 82
N. E. 521 (1907), would indicate that the Municipal Court of Chicago possess no
more than city court jurisdiction. It has been said to have the same jurisdiction
as a justice of the peace, according to Well v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 264 Ill. 425,
106 N. E. 246 (1914), but in Lott v. Davis, 264 Ill. 272, 106 N. E. 215 (1914), it was
held to have a composite jurisdiction.
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specific provision in the "home rule" amendment for the establishment of
a Municipal Court of Chicago evidences an intention by the framers thereof
that this authority should replace the earlier provision at least so far as a
local court for Chicago is concerned.
Assuming, for the moment, that the legislature was granted the power
to give to the Municipal Court of Chicago a jurisdiction not confined by
territorial limits, the question then arises as to whether it has exercised
that power and passed a statute which does confer extra-territorial jurisdiction.2 3 It would be well, in this regard, to give brief consideration to
the Municipal Court Act itself 24 and the construction which has been given
to it. Passed in 1905 and submitted to the voters of Chicago during the
same year, 25 the statute makes no mention of the fact that civil actions must
arise within the city limits in order for the court to possess jurisdiction
over them. There is significance in the contrast provided by the fact that
the City Court Act, at that time, included a definite limitation in the
phrase "arising in said city.' '26 If it was the intention of the legislature to
so limit the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Chicago, what explanation is there for the failure to include these important words? Is it not
more reasonable to infer that it deliberately omitted the phrase because it
did not mean to restrict such jurisdiction but, more nearly, considered the
court it was creating to be one having general jurisdiction over transitory
causes of action?
Probably the most conclusive argument of all is that the court itself
has felt, throughout the years, that it did possess, and has exercised, such a
jurisdiction. Actions often speak louder than words and at least two cases
23 There is dicta in a line of earlier cases to the effect that the Municipal Court
Act did not extend jurisdiction beyond the city limits, which might lead to the
inference that the legislature did not exercise to the fullest the authority given to
it by the amendment. See Wieboldt Stores v. Sturdy, 384 Il1. 271, 51 N. E. (2d)
268 (1943) ; People ex rel. Sokall v. Municipal Court of Chicago, 359 Ill. 102, 194
N. E. 242 (1935) ; Wilcox v. Conklin, 255 Ill. 604, 99 N. E. 669 (1912) ; People v.
Cosmopolitan Fire Ins. Co., 246 Ill. 442, 92 N. E. 992 (1910) ; People ex rel. Sadler
v. Olson, 245 Ill. 288, 92 N. E. 157 (1910) ; Miller v. People, 230 Ill. 65, 82 N. E. 521
(1907) ; Galpin v. City of Chicago, 159 Ill. App. 135 (1910), affirmed in 249 Ill. 554,
94 N. E. 961 (1910). The later cases would tend to indicate the opposite: City of
Chicago v. Cook County, 370 Ill. 301, 18 N. E. (2d) 890 (1939) ; People ex rel. Soble v.
Gill, 358 Ill. 261, 192 N. E. 193 (1934).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 356 et seq. Section 357 thereof describes
the subjects of action which the Municipal Court of Chicago is empowered to hear
and determine. It may be noted, for example, that the court does not possess a

general equity jurisdiction, nor may it grant divorces. A city court, by contrast,
may deal with such matters, subject to the territorial limitations imposed upon it.
25 Both the statute and the constitutional amendment relating to it were held
valid in City of Chicago v. Reeves, 220 Ill. 274, 77 N. E. 237 (1906), and in People
ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 358 Ill. 261, 192 N. E. 193 (1934).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 333 to § 355a, but particularly § 333. That statute
had been enacted on May 10, 1901.
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exist 27 in which the Municipal Court of Chicago has taken jurisdiction over
tort and contract actions arising outside of the city and in which judgments
have been reviewed on appeal without any mention of a possible jurisdictional question. Unquestionably, jurisdiction to hear and determine a
cause of action cannot be given either by the consent of the parties or by
their failure to raise the issue, so that a case decided by a court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter results only in a judgment that is
null and void.28 It being the well understood duty of a court, if it finds
it lacks jurisdiction, to dismiss the case, can it be said that the judgments
in the two cases mentioned were null and void and that both the Municipal
Court of Chicago and the Appellate Court were derelict in their duty by
passing on the matters brought before them without raising the jurisdictional issue? The answer would seem to be an obvious and a resounding
"No!"
There are practical, as well as legal, reasons why the decision in the
instant case should be reversed. No small matter of expense to residents
of Chicago is at stake. If they may not, in cases of this kind, turn to their
own relatively inexpensive tribunal, they will be forced to use the more
costly services of the Circuit, Superior or County Courts of Cook County. 29
Even more harmful would be the time-consuming delays which would be
forced upon them by the over-crowded calendars of these other and understaffed state courts. Delayed justice being, at best, an inferior brand of
relief, it is to be hoped that the Illinois Supreme Court will not force
Chicagoans to tread again the road to constitutional revision in order to
30
obtain that which is already their constitutional right.
R. T.

NELSON

INFANTS--PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCES-WHETHER A BONA FIDE PuRCHASER FROM AN INFANT'S TRANSFEREE Is TO BE PROTECTED IN CASE OF
DISAFFIRMANCE BY THE INFANT OF His CONTRACT OF SALF,--In the Arkansas
case of Jones v. Caldwell,1 a minor, by his next friend, brought an action
27 In Rapers v. Holmes, 292 Ill. App. 116, 10 N. E. (2d) 707 (1937), the court
dealt with a tort cause of action arising in Indiana. The earlier case of Israel v.
Selman, 263 Ill. App. 351 (1931), involved a contract cause of action based upon a
contract made, and to be performed, in Ohio.
28 Smith v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 381 Ill. 55, 44 N. E. (2d) 841 (1942);
Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbarger, 324 Ill. App. 176, 57 N. E. (2d) 901 (1944).
29 A press release issued by the Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago
indicates that there has already been a decline of from 10 to 15 per cent. in the
filing of civil tort and contract cases by reason of the decision in the instant case.
The release estimates that the Municipal Court will lose from 15,000 to 20,000 such

cases a year if the decision is affirmed.
30 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19, promises to all citizens the right to obtain "justice
freely, and without .. . delay."
1- Ark. -, 225 S. W. (2d) 323 (1949).
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to recover possession of an automobile which he had sold to a third party
who had, in turn, sold it to the defendant. The latter had purchased in
good faith, for value, and without notice of the incapacity of the vendor's
transferor. Despite a jury verdict for the defendant, the trial court, on
plaintiff's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, set the general
verdict aside and entered judgment for plaintiff. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled
to an instruction that if the jury found that the defendant had purchased
the automobile in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's
defect in title by reason of the original purchase from a minor, the verdict
should be for the defendant. The court specifically relied on Section 24
of the Uniform Sales Act 2 as the basis for refusing to follow what had
previously been the acknowledged common-law rule followed in that state.
The common-law rule had clearly allowed an infant not only to disaffirm his contract, even though the rights of innocent third parties had
intervened, but also permitted him to act to regain his property. Other
jurisdictions as well as Arkansas have followed this principle. 4 In Hovey
v. Hobson,5 for example, the Supreme Court of Maine, in a case concerning
the disaffirmance of a deed of an insane person, after declaring that the
acts of lunatics and infants were to be treated as analogous and subject
to the same rules, went on to state that the rights of an infant and of an
insane person to avoid a deed or contract was an absolute right, was
superior to all equities of other persons, and could be exercised against
bona fide purchasers from the grantee. Massachusetts had likewise held,
at least as to transfers of realty, that the absolute and paramount right of
the infant or the insane person to avoid a contract could be exercised
against even an innocent purchaser for value from the incompetent person's
grantee.6
It is true that the aforementioned cases specifically dealt with transfers
of realty, but the courts concerned did not limit the principle expressed to
such circumstances. A reading of the cases would disclose that the attitude
expressed therein was, ostensibly at least, intended to apply as a general
rule based upon social, economic, and moral concepts concerning infants,
and not upon the nature of the subject matter involved. Application of
2 Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 1, § 24. A comparable provision may be found in Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1212, § 24.
3 Rowe v. Allison, 87 Ark. 206, 112 S. W. 395 (1908) ; Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556,
109 S. W. 534 (1908) ; Harrod v. Myers, 21 Ark. 592, 76 Am. Dec. 409 (1860).
4 Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S. W. 372 (1891); Mustard v. Wohiford's
Heirs, 15 Gra. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209 (1859).
5 53 Me. 451, 89 Am. Dec. 705 (1866).
6 Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 126 N. E. 271 (1920).
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the principle to cases involving other than realty transactions may be
typified by the holding in Downing v. Stone.7 It was held therein that a
contract for the sale of goods made by an infant was voidable during the
infant's minority, so that, upon his election to avoid the contract and upon
giving notice to his vendee of such recission, tendering the return of the
consideration received if he still had it, the matter would stand as if no
sale had ever been made. The infant might then follow the property he
had delivered to the vendee, into whomsoever's hands it may have passed,
with full right to recover it in kind or to maintain trover for its conversion
if possession was denied to him.8
The foregoing discussion serves to exemplify the attitude of the common law toward the problem of disaffirmance of contracts made by infants.
The court in the instant case found a basis for a contrary holding in Section
24 of the Uniform Sales Act. That section states, in substance, that where
one who has acquired a title to goods, but which title is voidable in nature,
transfers such title prior to the time when his title has been avoided, the
one who takes from him gets a good title provided the taker acts in good
9
faith, pays value, and has no notice of the defect in his transferor's title.
The word "infant" does not expressly appear in the section, so the question becomes one of whether or not an infant's contract comes within its
terms by inference. In that connection, it may first be noted that the term
"voidable," as employed in the section, is used without any qualifying
clause. It may be reasonably inferred, from this fact, that the framers of
the statute used that term in its ordinary legal connotation, intending
thereby to include all contracts considered voidable, for whatever reason,
at the time of the enactment of the section. Certainly, this line of reasoning would bring the contracts of infants within the purview of Section 24,
for they have generally been regarded to be voidable, rather than void.
A second argument offered to support the holding in the instant case
was adduced from a reading of the whole of the Uniform Sales Act. The
Arkansas court noted that the legislature had expressly excluded infants
7 47 Mo. App. 144 (1891).
S The language of the Downing case is not only clear but also comprehensive.
Language more colloquial in character, but to the same effect, was employed in
Mellott v. Love, 152 Miss. 860, 119 So. 913 (1929). It was there said, In a case
concerning an infant who disaffirmed his purchase of shares of stock in a bank,
that the infant's right to avoid a contract because of infancy was not affected by
the fact that the rights of third parties had intervened.
9 Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 1, § 24. The section has most often been applied to transfers of title in cases wherein fraud has been involved. In that regard, the New
York court concerned in the case of Neal, Clark & Neal Co. v. Tarby, 99 Misc. 380,
163 N. Y. S. 675 (1917), stated that the section merely restated the common law
which accorded protection to the innocent party against one whose actions had
placed the offender in a position to do wrong.
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from the workings of the act wherever it had clearly desired to do so. 10
The absence of express exclusionary language in Section 24 was held to be
indicative of an intention that it should be applied to infants' contracts
as well as to those of admittedly competent persons. The argument might
be weakened to some extent by a firm policy of according to infants a
favored position in law which might be taken to require an express legislative mandate for inclusion, rather than an implied exclusion, of infants
under the section in question. Further guidance in this connection, however, is offered. by Professor Williston, whose role in both the drafting and
the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act is well known. Specifically commenting upon Section 24, he once wrote: "In a few classes of cases,
however, the law as distinguished from equity gives a special right of
avoiding a transfer of title, a right which has been held to exist not simply
against the first taker of title, but against any subsequent transferee irrespectively of bona fides or value. This has been the privilege of infants
and in jurisdictions where the contract of a lunatic is regarded as analogous
to that of infants the same principle has been applied. In regard to such
cases this section of the Sales Act works a change in the law. It is desirable that at some time the title to goods bought from an infant or lunatic
should be protected and the advantage to trade and stability of titles
justifies the diminution in the privilege of infants and lunatics." 1
Similar reasoning underlies the instant case and supports, at least in
part, a few of the decisions relied upon by the Arkansas court as authority
for the position it adopted. The first, and perhaps the principal, of these
authorities is the case of Casey v. joastel.1 2 In that case, an infant sought
to disaffirm his contract for the sale of stock certificates, made through an
agent, and thereby affect the rights of third parties. The New York court,
applying Section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act, treated the sales contract as
being only voidable in nature and, as it had not been avoided by the infant
before a bona fide purchaser for value had taken title without notice, it held
the latter had obtained a good title. The second of these cases, that of
Carpenter v. Grow,' 3 concerned a situation somewhat more akin to the
instant case than the one involved in the Casey decision. The minor there
concerned had purchased an automobile and had paid for the same by way
10 The court called particular attention to Section 2, one which deals with capacity
to contract and with liability for necessaries: Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 1, § 2. That
section expressly includes infants among those who are required to pay only a
reasonable price for necessaries furnished, as distinguished from other parties who
would, generally, have to pay the contract price.
11 See Williston, Sales, Vol. 2, § 348, p. 349.
12 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671, 31 A. L. R. 995 (1924). New York adopted the
Uniform Sales Act in 1911.
13 247 Mass. 133, 141 N. E. 859 (1923). The Uniform Sales Act was adopted by
that state in 1909.
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of a trade-in plus cash and notes. The vendor having resold the automobile
received in trade from the infant, the court limited the infant's recovery
against the vendor to the money advanced. It stated that while the avoidance of the infant's contract had caused the contract to be void ab initio,
the Uniform Sales Act had deprived the infant "of any rights against the
defendant's transferee.' '14
Where the question of the applicability of Section 24 of the Uniform
Sales Act to infants' contracts has been directly raised, courts of accepted
authority have recognized the protection afforded by it to third persons
who have acted in a bona fide fashion. The same result was achieved in the
Iowa case of Vfp-ehl v. Means,1" but no mention was made therein of a
possible application of Section 24 to the situation there at hand. The
problem involved concerned three infants who had entered into a partnership agreement. Two of the infants attempted to avoid a contract which
had been made, on behalf of the partnership, by the third. The court,
speaking of the right to so avoid as applied to the adult party who had contracted with the infants, said: "The right of a minor to pursue his property
upon disaffirmance into the hands of a third party may not be predicated
upon the mere fact of his minority. Such right of pursuit must be predicated not only upon minority and disaffirmance, but upon some form of
fraud chargeable to the third party. Where a minor parts with his property on a contract valid until disaffirmed, the third parties, becoming
innocent purchasers thereof for value are entitled to protection as such.
If a minor seeks recourse beyond the party with whom he contracts, he
must connect such third party in some manner by notice or otherwise with
the contract which he disaffirms. "16
The precise question here involved does not appear to have arisen in
Illinois to date, but the state has adhered to common-law doctrines, particularly as they bear on the general problem of avoidance of infants' contracts. 1 7 It has been held that contracts concerning the sale of personalty
may be avoided by the infant either during or after minority and that
247 Mass. 133 at 137, 141 N. E. 859 at 861.
206 Iowa 539, 218 N. W. 907 (1928). Section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act could
have been cited, as it had been adopted in Iowa as early as 1919.
16 206 Iowa 539 at 547, 218 N. W. 907 at 911.
17 The following cases illustrate the general state of the law in Illinois as to
avoidance of contracts made by infants: Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill. 398,
89 N. E. 796 (1909) ; Fuller v. Pool, 258 Ill. App. 513 (1930) ; Crandell v. Coyne
Electrical School, 256 Ill. App. 322 (1930) ; Collins v. Peter's Real Estate Corp., 252
Ill. App. 348 (1929) ; Kuipers v. Thome, 182 Ill. App. 28 (1913) ; Pennsylvania Corp.
v. Purvis, 128 Ill. App. 367 (1906); Ashlock v. Vivell, 38 Ill. App. 57 (1890). In
Fuller v. Pool, 258 Ill. App. 513 (1930), the court cited with approval a statement
made in 14 R. C. L. p. 242 to the effect that upon disaffirmance of a contract by an
infant, the rights of the parties are as if the contract had never existed.
14

15
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there is, for this purpose, no distinction in law between executory and
executed contracts. For that matter, it was said in Hunter v. Egolf Motor
Company,18 that a minor was not precluded from asserting his right to
disaffirm a contract by the fact that the disaffirmance might operate injuriously and unjustly against the other party. These holdings, of course,
grew out of situations which concerned only the infant and his other contracting party, but they may be indicative of a desire to provide a farreaching protection for the infant. If the infant is to be protected to the
fullest extent, it could be argued that similar results should be obtained in
cases of resale of the chattels by the infant's transferee, particularly where
only the return of the specific chattel would serve to mitigate the situation.
But the dangers involved in such a possibility should be weighed against
the benefits to be derived from a contrary rule, one which could be built
around a comparable interpretation of the Illinois statute. The problem
is, then, one of setting a fair limit upon the extent of the protection to be
afforded to infants while at the same time not acting to deprive innocent
third persons of their rights. As stability of titles is a prerequisite, in a
commercial world, to sound business dealings, there would seem to be much
justification for fixing that limit at the precise point established by the
instant case.
R. L. ENGBER

JOINT TENANCY-CREATION

AND

EXISTENCF-WHETHER

OR NOT THE

LEASING OF A SAFETY DEPOSIT Box UNDER A JOINT TENANCY LEASE EsTABLISHIES A JOINT TENANCY IN THE CONTENTS OF

SucH Box-By its decision

in the case of In re Wilson's Estate,' the Illinois Supreme Court has placed
a novel interpretation on an Illinois statute regulating joint tenancies2 at
least insofar as such statute applies to the contents of safety deposit boxes.
The proceeding there involved was instituted by two of the beneficiaries
under a will to compel the wife of the testator, who acted as executrix of
the estate, to include, in her inventory of the estate, the contents of two
safety deposit boxes as well as the balance on deposit of a joint bank
account. Both the safety deposit boxes and the bank account were held in
joint tenancy by the testator and the executrix. Despite this, the beneficiaries, who were children of the testator by a former marriage, contended
that the personal property contained in the boxes and the balance of the
bank account were the sole property of the testator. The widow-executrix,
18 268 11. App. 1 (1932).
1404 Ill. 207, 88 N. E. (2d) 662 (1949), noted in 38 Il.
Ill. App. 18, 82 N. E. (2d) 684 (1948).
2 Il.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2.

B. J. 228, affirming 336
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on the other hand, contended that, as the property in question was held
under joint tenancy agreement made between the testator, the widow, and
the bank, the entire property in question passed to her by right of survivorship. In further support of her claims, the widow offered a note or memorandum found in one of the boxes which bore the signature of the testator
and purported to create a joint tenancy in the contents thereof. The trial
court found in favor of the executrix, but its judgment was reversed and
3
the cause was remanded by the Appellate Court for the Second District.
Upon further appeal by the executrix, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Appellate Court insofar as it had held that no joint
tenancy had been created over the contents of the safety deposit boxes but
it reached the conclusion that the balance on deposit in the bank account
had passed to the widow-executrix as survivor. The significance of the
case lies in the fact that the court held that neither the leasing agreement
with the bank for the rental of the safety deposit box nor the note found
therein were sufficient to constitute that "instrument in writing" made
necessary by the statute prescribing the method for the creation of a joint
tenancy in personal property.
The present Illinois statute abolishes the right of survivorship by way
of joint tenancy in personal property except in the special instances therein
enumerated, to-wit: property held by executors and trustees, and in cases
where, by will or other instrument in writing, there is an expressed intention to create a joint tenancy in the personalty with the right of survivorship. A separate provision of the statute permits a bank to accept deposits
payable on demand to one or more, and to accept a receipt or acquittance
of any one or more as a full discharge from all, so long as an agreement
providing for such payment is signed by all of the parties, either at the
time the account is opened or thereafter. A similar provision exists covering the payment of dividends or earnings of stock jointly held where there
is an agreement in writing signed by such joint owners. The court had
little difficulty, therefore, in reaching the conclusion that the money remaining on deposit in the joint bank account belonged to the widowexecutrix in her own right. As the account had been carried in the names
of both the executrix and the testator, under an agreement in writing
which the parties had entered into with the bank, the balance of the account
4
obviously fell within the statutory exception outlined above.
The question of ownership of a quantity of currency and of certain
bearer bonds found in the safety deposit boxes presented a more difficult
3336 Ill. App. 18, 82 N. E. (2d) 684 (1948), noted in 37 Ill. B. J. 212.
4

See also Reder v. Reder, 312 Ii1. 209, 143 N. E. 418 (1924) ; Illinois Trust &
546 (1923); Erwin v. Felter,

Savings Bank v. Van Viack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N. E.
283 Ill. 36, 119 N. E. 926, L. R. A. 1918E 776 (1918).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

problem. The precise issue faced by the court was whether either the
rental contract with the bank, under which these boxes had been rented,
or a note found in one of the boxes, constituted a written instrument within
the statutory provision, that is one which not only created the estate but
also served to express an intention of giving to it the incident of survivorship.
The existence of a leasing agreement purporting to create a joint
tenancy in the contents of the safety deposit box has generated a problem
which has been litigated in a number of American jurisdictions with considerable lack of unanimity in the holdings pronounced by the various
courts. In one of the earliest cases, that of Mercantile Safety Deposit
Company v. Huntington,5 it was held that the presence of a joint ownership
of a safety deposit box, under a leasing agreement with a bank, indicated
nothing as to the ownership of the contents, for the only inference to be
drawn from such joint ownership of the box was that the parties had an
intention to qualify each of the depositors for access to the box and no
more.6 The independent ownership of property by one of the parties was
said not to be altered by the act of placing such property in a safety deposit
box rented under a joint tenancy lease. That action has been held insufficient to establish joint ownership even where the parties are husband and
wife. 7 Not even the presence of an express recital to the effect that the
contents of a box leased by husband and wife were the joint property of
both lessees and should, upon the death of either party, pass to the survivor
was regarded as being sufficient, in the Arkansas case of Black v. Black,s
to establish common ownership of the contents. The clause was there said
to be for the protection of the lessor and merely determined, as between the
lessor and lessees, that the lessees were joint tenants. It has also been
held that, where either party has a right to surrender the box to the lessor,
the rental agreement would not even serve to create a joint tenancy as to
the box, much less of its contents. 9
The contrary view, one holding that the leasing of a safety deposit box
under a joint tenancy rental agreement does establish joint ownership in
the contents of such box, rests on the theory that the lease does disclose an
intention on the part of the lessees to establish such a relationship. A
5 89 Hun. 465, 35 N. Y. S. 390 (1895).
6 Much the same view is expressed in the later cases of Security First National
Bank of Los Angeles v. Stack, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 586, 90 P. (2d) 337 (1939), and
Richards v. Richards, 141 N. J. Eq. 579, 58 A. (2d) 544 (1948).
7 Clevidence v. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co., 355 Mo. 904, 199 S. W. (2d) 1
(1947) ; Matter of Brown, 86 Misc. 187, 149 N. Y. S. 138 (1914) ; In re Wohleber's
Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 181 A. 479 (1935).
8 199 Ark. 609, 135 S. W. (2d) 837 (1940).
9 Millman v. Streeter, 66 R. 1. 341, 19 A. (2d) 254 (1941).
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perfect illustration of this view may be observed in the case of Graham v.
Barnes'0 where it was held that negotiable bonds owned by an intestate
and placed in a safety deposit box leased in the joint names of the intestate
and his mistress, became the sole property of the mistress by right of survivorship upon the decease of the intestate. Other cases reach the same
result in the absence of any statute regulating joint tenancies" but they
12
may turn on the precise language of the agreement.
In electing to adopt the first of these views, to-wit: the mere fact that
persons lease a safety deposit box as joint tenants does not, in and by itself,
create a joint tenancy in the contents thereof, the Illinois court reasoned
that, to fulfill the requirements of the statute, it was essential that the
written instrument purporting to create the joint tenancy relationship had
to be one in the form of a conveyance of an interest in the property. A
rental agreement could hardly accomplish this result as it would be a
writing entered into between the bank on the one hand, as lessor, and the
husband and wife on the other, as lessees, rather than between a vendor and
vendees. Furthermore, no specific property would be described in a leasing
contract covering a safety deposit vault whereas it would be essential, in
order to create a joint tenancy in personal property, for that property to
be definitely described in the instrument evidencing the ownership. While
the decision in the instant case merely purported to invalidate the attempted
creation of a joint tenancy by reason of the particular leasing agreement
therein involved, it would be reasonable to conclude that it is not possible,
in Illinois, to utilize a safety deposit box lease as an instrument by which
to establish a joint tenancy relationship as to the personalty contained
therein," for the reasoning of the court, in reaching that result, would be
10 259 Mass. 534, 156 N. E. 865 (1927).

11 See Brown v. Navarre, 64 Ariz. 262, 169 P. (2d) 85 (1946) ; Lilly v. Schmock,
297 Mich. 513, 298 N. W. 116 (1941), where the court stated that there was no
statute or court decisions in the jurisdiction forbidding the creation of a right of

survivorship in personalty when done by the express act of the parties; In re
Petersen's Estate, 239 Mich. 452, 214 N. W. 418 (1927).
12 The California cases have come to divergent results by interpretation of individual leasing agreements: Gelber, "The Unintentional Creation of a Joint Tenancy
in the Contents of a Safety Deposit Box," 32 Cal. L. Rev. 301 (1944). Cases holding
that a joint tenancy was created appear in Hausfelder v. Security First Nat. Bank
of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 478, 176 P. (2d) 84 (1946) ; In re Gaines' Estate,
15 Cal. (2d) 255, 100 P. (2d) 1055 (1940); Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306,
14 P. (2d) 580 (1932). But see contra: California Trust Co. v. Bennett, 33 Cal.
(2d) 694, 204 P. (2d) 324 (1949); In re Dean's Estate, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 86,
155 P. (2d) 901 (1945) ; Security First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Stack, 32 Cal.
App. (2d) 586, 90 P. (2d) 337 (1939).
'3 See In re Jirovec's Estate, 285 Il1.
App. 113, 3 N. E. (2d) 102 (1936), where
the Illinois Appellate Court held that the application card for the lease of a safety
deposit box signed by the co-renters and bearing the stamp "either or survivor"
was not sufficient to create a joint tenancy in the contents of the box, but was
merely an expression of an intention to authorize the bank to allow access to the

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

applicable to all such leasing agreements, no matter how detailed or comprehensive they may be.
The court was, however, confronted with a much more difficult problem
when it had to determine the effect of the note which had been signed by
the deceased and left in the safety deposit box. 1 4 That note merely stated
that there was a certain sum in the box and that such money was held in
joint tenancy by the maker and his wife, but the query was whether this
note represented such an "instrument in writing" as would satisfy statutory requirements. For this purpose, the court considered the meaning of
the words "instrument in writing" to be the equivalent of such a written
instrument as would comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds
insofar as it relates to conveyances of personalty upon a consideration not
deemed valuable in law. 15 The last mentioned statute requires that transfers of goods and chattels, without a consideration deemed valuable in law,
must be by will or deed, as in the case of real property, or by possession
remaining bona fide in the donee. By application of this interpretation to
the note concerned in the present case, the court readily found that there
was no conveyance of property present, words of transfer being lacking,
in addition to which the note did not even express an intention to create a
joint tenancy relationship. 16
. It may be inferred, from this reasoning, that if the language of such
a note were comprehensive enough it might be sufficient to establish a joint
tenancy over the contents of a safety deposit box. Perhaps the court had
in mind the written agreement which had been presented to the Illinois
Appellate Court in the case of In re Koester's Estate.'7 The written agreement there concerned had provided that all property placed or contained
in the safety deposit box, whether put there before or subsequent to the
making of the agreement, should belong to the lessees jointly with right of
survivorship. That writing was held to be such an instrument as would
comply with statutory requirements. The facts of that case, however, disbox by either or both the co-renters and to protect the bank in case of withdrawal
of securities by either. Subsequent to the decision in the case here under consideration, the Appellate Court reiterated the holding thereof in the case of In re Brokaw's
Estate, 399 IUl. App. 353, 90 N. E. (2d) 300 (1950).
14 The note read: "There is $37,000 in this box and it is a joint tenancy between
my wife Mary Aldah Wilson, and myself. E. G. Wilson, M.D. 6-11-46." See 404
Ill.
207 at 209, 88 N. E. (2d) 662 at 663.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 6.
16In Napier v. Eigel, 350 Mo. 111, 164 S. W. (2d) 608 (1942), the court found
that a note left in a safety deposit box designating that certain funds in the box
were for the emergency use of the deceased and her surviving sister did not serve
to establish a joint tenancy in the funds upon the happening of the contingency.
17286 Il. App. 113, 3 N, E. (2d) 102 (1936). The note there concerned was a
separate agreement signed by the husband and wife, but executed at the time the
leasing agreement was made with the bank.
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close that securities had been purchased by each of the parties from their
individual funds and had been placed in the box subsequent to the date of
the written agreement. The Appellate Court indicated that the written
agreement was operative on such after-acquired property, even though such
property was originally purchased from the sole funds of one of the parties.
In view of the fact that in that case, as in the present one, there was no
specific description of the property nor any separate conveyance, it would
seem that the contract there involved would be inadequate in the light of
the present decision by the Supreme Court.
Even supposing words of conveyance were present, there is some question as to whether such a writing would have created a joint tenancy in the
contents of a box. It is fundamental to the proper creation of a joint
tenancy at common law that there be unity in the four elements of title,
interest, time and possession, so that the joint tenants must have the same
interest, accruing under the same conveyance, commencing at the same
time, and hold under the same undivided possession.' 8 An intention alone,
no matter how emphatically expressed, 19 is not sufficient to create rights;
for to create such intended rights the intent must be carried into effect by
acts which are legally capable of accomplishing the intended purpose.
How, then, can one already holding title expect to create a joint tenancy in
personalty by his own unilateral act? Should he not be required to follow
the time-honored method utilized in real estate transactions, under which
he divests himself of his individual title to a disinterested third person and
receives a reconveyance to himself and his joint tenant? Only in that
fashion may the four unities be preserved.
It is true that it was not necessary for the court, in the instant case,
to decide whether it was essential that the four unities be preserved as the
instrument itself was found to be insufficient, making recourse to the
subsidiary problem unnecessary. It may be noted, however, that the court
may have intimated that the four unities might be necessary for it cited a
case to this effect. 20 In this regard the court would appear to be contradicting itself, as well as disagreeing with the reasoning of the Appellate
Court in the Koester case, for the four unities were not discussed as being
an essential attribute to the creation of a joint tenancy relationship either
in the instant case or in that case. On the contrary, it might be argued
that as the statute enacted to govern the creation of joint tenancy in per18 Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 Il. 413, 34 N. E. (2d) 414
(1941); Deslaurlers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928). See also Millman
v. Streeter, 66 R. I. 341, 19 A. (2d) 254 (1941).
19 Strout v. Burgess, - Me. -, 68 A. (2d) 240 (1949).
20 Reference was made in the opinion to the holding in Hood v. Commonwealth
Trust & Savings Bank, 376 I1. 413, 34 N. E. (2d) 414 (1941).
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sonal property does not mention the need for the four unities, it may, by
superseding the common law, have, by its very silence, obviated the necessity for these formalities. That argument may not prove to be successful,
if the court should extend its process of interpretation. It has imposed
the requirement that the writing be in the form of a conveyance, although
a perusal of the statute will reveal that the word "conveyance" is lacking
in its context. If the court continues to think in terms of the four unities,
a unilateral agreement by one already holding title may also, by interpretation, prove insufficient unless it can operate as a will.
There is enough in the decision to disquiet the peace of mind of persons who have attempted to establish joint tenancy relationships in personal property. As the statute now stands, the result attained is logical
and sound, but may not be the one expected. The legislature, which saw
fit to abolish the right of survivorship in personal property, except in the
instances enumerated, should consider a revision of the statute. Despite
the reticence with which the law recognizes the ownership of property in
joint tenancy, a vast amount of wealth is now represented by personal
property of a kind particularly adaptable to storage in safety deposit box
facilities. If joint tenancy ownership thereof requires full compliance with
the details made necessary for joint tenancy ownership of real property, it
is time the legislature said so.
W. P. MCCRAY
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-USE AND REGULATION OF PUBLIC PLACES,
PROPERTY, AND WORKS-WHETHER OR NOT A MUNICIPALITY Is LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENTLY FAILING TO CORRECT A DEFECTIVE AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC CONTROL DEvIcE-The Illinois Supreme Court, in an unprecedented decision in
the case of Johnston v. City of East Moline,' affirmed a decision of the
Appellate Court for the Second District which had upheld a trial court
decision to the effect that a city is liable for damages arising from an
automobile accident proximately caused by the malfunctioning of a traffic
signal. The plaintiff's complaint charged that she, as a passenger in the
automobile of another, had entered a partially controlled street intersection
at the invitation of a green light when the car in which she was riding was
violently struck by another automobile which had entered the intersection
from a transverse direction then uncontrolled because of a failure in the
operation of the traffic light. The plaintiff predicated her suit upon the
alleged negligence of the city in failing to repair the malfunctioning traffic
light for a period of six days after notice of the defect. The city dis1405 Il. 460, 91 N. E. (2d) 401 (1950), affirming 338 Ill. App. 220, 87 N. E. (2d)
22 (1949).
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claimed liability on the ground that the maintenance and operation of
traffic signals constituted a governmental function for which there could
be no liability in damages. All courts concerned with the particular case,
in holding for the plaintiff, ruled that the conduct of operating and maintaining highway traffic signal lights was non-governmental rather than
governmental in character, as a consequence of which the defendant could
be held liable for its negligence in failing to readjust or repair the light
within a reasonable time.
Courts have always taken the position that municipal corporations, at
least as to defects in the surfacing of streets, would be exposed to liability
for neglect.2 Such liability has generally been viewed as arising by necessary implication from the fact that municipal corporations are usually
invested with exclusive authority and control over the streets within the
corporate limits. Possessing the means for the construction and repair of
such streets, it is only fitting that municipal duty should arise, in favor of
the public, to keep the streets in a reasonably safe condition. As a necessary corollary thereof, a corresponding liability exists to respond in
3
damages to those who might be injured by a neglect to perform that duty.
But the duty has been extended beyond mere responsibility for care over
the surface of the travelled way, for Illinois courts have generally been
quite liberal in their interpretation of what constitutes a street and its
appurtenances. It has been held, for example, that municipalities may be
liable for damage caused by negligence in repairing water mains, 4 in permitting uninsulated electric wires to so obstruct the public streets as to
render them dangerous, 5 in not preventing the falling of defective awnings,6
in allowing a trash fire set by a street sweeper to ignite the clothing of a
child, 7 in not repairing or removing a traffic signal platform which contained acid so that the same might not splash on and burn a pedestrian,8
and for allowing a metal "stop" sign to become loose so that it might
fall and strike a child playing on the streetY
In contrast, however, the regulation of traffic upon the street has generally been considered to be a governmental function, with the attendant
effect that the municipality is not liable for injuries or damages which may
arise out of negligence in the control of such traffic. A municipal cor2 In general, see 63 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, § 782.
3 Browning v. City of Springfield, 17 Ill. 143 (1850).
4 City of Chicago v. Selz, Schwab & Co., 202 Ill. 545, 67 N. E. 306 (1903).
5 Village of Palatine v. Siter, 225 Ill. 630, 80 N. E. 345 (1907).
6 Hanrahan v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 400, 124 N. E. 547 (1919).
7 Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Il. 70, 163 N. E. 361 (1928).
8 Koch v. City of Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 103, 17 N. E. (2d) 411 (1938).
9 Scarpici v. City of Chicago, 329 Ill. App. 434, 69 N. E. (2d) 100 (1946).
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poration, for example, is said not to be liable for the acts of its officers
when attempting to enforce police regulations nor is it liable for the wrongf ul or negligent acts of its police officers while they are acting in the
performance of their public duties.' 0 In that regard, courts have held that
devices installed by the municipality to aid or assist the police in regulating
traffic are installed and operated under an exercise of the governmental
function so that the municipality is relieved from liability arising from a
negligent installation or operation of such a device, provided the same does
not actually constitute a physical defect in the street itself. In Kirk v. City
of Muskogee," for example, an Oklahoma court once stated that "a municipality is liable for damages sustained from defects in its streets, but
there is a clear distinction between the failure of a city to keep its streets
in a safe condition as regards physical defects therein, and failure or
neglect in regulating traffic thereon. "12
Cases from other jurisdictions,
with similar fact situations to the instant case, hold that, as regulation of
traffic is a governmental function, any traffic signals installed to assist in
such regulation are no more than mechanical substitutes for police officers
so as to be within the general immunity provided for acts done pursuant to
such governmental function.' 3
It would appear, from its decision in the instant case, that the Illinois
court refuses to follow a well-ordered path of legal logic established in
other jurisdictions where governmental immunity has been permitted to
attach to inanimate or mechanical signals designed to regulate traffic. It
is difficult to determine why a municipality should be immune from liability for injuries produced by the negligence of its human officers engaged
in the regulation of traffic but be exposed to liability where the same
function is being exercised by mechanical traffic signals. As the job being
done is the same in both cases, any difference in the result must be attributed to some other factor. The court in the instant case hints at a distinction but does not, as is so often the case, make that distinction clear
in precise words. It mentions that traffic signals perform their functions
in a ministerial or non-discretionary manner. It is self-evident that an
inanimate regulator does not have the ability to exercise any discretion.
10 See, in general, Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. 2, § 773; McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., Vol. 6, § 2801.
11183 Okla. 536, 83 P. (2d) 594 (1938).
12 183 Okla. 536 at 537, 83 P. (2d) 594 at 595.
13 Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689 (1936); Avey v.
City of West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So. (2d) 881 (1943) ; Sandman v.
Sheehan, 279 Ky. 614, 131 S. W. (2d) 484 (1939); Auslander v. City of St. Louis,
332 Mo. 145, 56 S. W. (2d) 778 (1932) ; Hodges v. City of Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737,
200 S. E. 891 (1939) ; Vickers v. City of Camden, 122 N. 3. L. 14, 3 A. (2d) 613
(1939) ; Martin v. City of Canton, 41 Ohio App. 420, 180 N. E. 78 (1931).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DEOISIONS

It merely blinks or buzzes at regularly fixed intervals and is totally lacking
in the ability to change its procedures as the needs of the traffic might
demand. By contrast, an officer set to directing traffic, while performing
the same function, may exercise discretion for his procedures may be
changed to fit the occasion. Therein may lie the clue.
It has been the custom in the past for some jurisdictions, including
Illinois, to utilize a distinction between discretionary and ministerial
powers in determining whether a particular municipal function is governmental or proprietary in character. If the former, immunity from
14
Such reasoning proceeds on
tort liability exists; if the latter, it does not.
the basis that an exercise of discretion is the main element called for in the
discharge of legislative or judicial powers, by reason of which they are
purely governmental in nature. Ministerial powers, on the other hand,
have no such connotation. If this test be applied to the regulation of traffic
on streets and highways, one is forced to conclude that the promulgation of
all regulatory measures calls for the exercise of discretion so, if the pattern
of logic is followed, should be classified as being governmental in character.
The Illinois court, however, carries the reasoning process one step farther.
It now requires that the element of discretion must be present in all phases
of the function, that is not only in the promulgation of the regulation but
also in the mode of putting such regulation into operation. As the complete element of discretion is lacking in the case of a mechanical traffic
regulator, immunity from tort liability must also be absent. One hesitates
to say how far that thought may be carried but the instant case clearly
indicates that when, in Illinois, a traffic signal has been installed it immediately becomes an appurtenance to the street or highway for which the
municipality must become responsible. When it ceases to function properly and becomes a physical hazard to traffic, the municipality which
negligently allows the signal to continue in that status must expect to be
liable for any injury caused thereby.
J. E. STRTJNCK

14 The extent to which that distinction may be pushed, entirely out of all proportion to its proper functioning, may be observed in the holding In Mower v. Williams.
402 Ill. 486, 84 N. E. (2d) 435 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 103,
where a highway maintenance employee, charged with driving a snow plow, was
absolved from liability for colliding with a passenger vehicle because engaged in a
"governmental" function. Crampton, J., dissented. The amount of "discretion"
involved in the act of driving a truck, with snow plow attached, on a public
highway may be classed as negligible.

